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Abstract
This paper solves an empirically parameterized model of households’ optimal de-
mand for nominal and inflation indexed annuities. The model incorporates mortality,
inflation, and real interest rate risk.
The model draws some interesting predictions. First, the welfare calculations on
the access to annuities markets show that nominal annuities are welfare improving
even when sold at the empirically parameterized cost, which is above fair value. Real
annuities are welfare improving over nominal annuities when sold at a fair price,
but when we incorporate the empirically parameterized annuity premium the gains
become negative at all wealth levels.
Second, the simulation of the model for the British population wealth distribution
shows that an important explanation for the little interest in annuities comes from
the fact that annuities are extremely expensive, compared with the total accumulated
assets held by households. In other words many households can not aﬀord even to
enter the annuity market.
The paper also compares the simulated annuity demand to the actual demands
reported in the Family Resources Survey. For those individuals who buy annuities,
the simulated demands are not very diﬀerent from those observed in the survey.
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1 Introduction
Currently, and in most countries, the government, through the first pillar of the social
security system, insures retirees against inflation and longevity risk. At retirement,
the state pension that each retiree is entitled to receive is computed based on his
lifetime earnings. The retiree is entitled to receive this pension for as long as he lives,
and in this way obtains insurance against longevity risk. In addition, and in most
countries, nominal state pensions are indexed to a measure of consumer prices such
as the consumer price index (CPI), so that the real purchasing power of retirees is
relatively unaﬀected by inflation movements.2
In recent years, economists and politicians in most Western countries have become
increasingly worried with the sustainability of the current social security system and
its current level of benefits. The ageing of the population has led to a dramatic and
unsustainable increase in liabilities.
Consequently the second and third pillar of the social security system, which are
mostly funded systems, have become increasingly important in financing households’
retirement. In a funded system, each person accumulates savings in a retirement
account which will become liquid at retirement age.
However, accumulated financial wealth that is run down at retirement may not be
a good alternative to state pensions, because it lacks some of the insurance features of
the latter. A portfolio of financial assets does not necessarily provide insurance against
inflation risk and longevity risk. Whereas in certain countries retirees may invest their
financial portfolio in inflation-indexed bonds and in this way insure themselves against
inflation risk, it may be harder to obtain insurance against longevity risk.
As demonstrated in the pioneering work of Yaari (1965), the optimal choice of
a non-altruistic individual is to hold all his assets on actuarial notes, whenever the
2We say relatively unaﬀected because state pensions are usually indexed to expected inflation
which may diﬀer from realized inflation, and because the basket of goods of a typical retiree may be
diﬀerent than the basket of goods used to compute the CPI.
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probability of death is positive. This result is driven by the fact that the annuity
system reduces the ineﬃciency created by the uncertainty of the time of death, as
well as the fact that actuarial notes pay a higher interest (market interest rate plus a
mortality premium) conditional of being alive.
Applying this result, one alternative is for individuals to use their accumulated
financial wealth to purchase an annuity upon retirement. If the annuity is inflation-
indexed it will insure the retiree against inflation movements in addition to longevity
risk. Annuities are oﬀered in the private marketplace in many countries, including
the United Kingdom. Thus, it seems, the features of state pensions may be replicated
in the marketplace, at some cost, for households who wish to do so.
One concern, though, is that the interest by retirees in annuities in the private
marketplace has, to this date, been limited.3 Literature on annuity demand has been
trying to reconcile this fact with the theory by relaxing some of the Yaari’s model
restrictive assumptions. Namely, perfect information, no bequest motive, adjustable
annuity payout and no uncertainty other than the time of death.
One line of reasoning is based on the imperfect information of the annuity market
which results in self selection. This externality could drive households to insure
themselves within the family units instead of relying on a private annuity market,
as in Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000). However, despite
the self selection in annuities markets, empirical evidence shows that annuities are no
longer unfairly priced. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) find that the
expected present discounted value of payoﬀs, relative to the initial cost of the annuity,
has been increasing over time in the U.S.. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and Cannon
and Tonks (2002) present evidence that annuity rates are not unreasonably low in
the U.K..
Yagi and Nishigaki (1993) attribute the low demand for annuities to the fact
that the annuity market is constrained to constant payouts (either nominal or real)
3This empirical regularity has been well documented in previous studies. See Friedman and
Warshawsky (1990), Poterba and Wise (1996) and Brown (1999), among others.
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as opposed to the ones assumed in Yaari’s model which are adjusted to optimal
consumption during retirement.
Another type of explanations for the low demand of annuities is the bequest
motive. Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981) argue that intergenerational transfers account
for the vast majority of savings in the U.S. and therefore households refrain from
annuitizing their wealth. Recall that in Yaari’s model there was no bequest motive
for holding monetary wealth. However, Brown (2001) finds no evidence that bequest
motives are important factor in making marginal annuity decisions.
Introducing a risky asset as means of investment can improve the budget constraint
in the future and therefore create a real option value of delaying the decision to
annuitize. This is the path taken in Moshe and Young (2002), in order to show that
it might be optimal for the individual to delay annuitization.
Bernheim (1991) presents empirical evidence that strongly suggests that state
pensions have provided most (or all) longevity risk that retirees required. Once that
is not longer the case the demand for annuities will increase.
In order to investigate the plausibility of this explanation, the present paper pro-
poses a dynamic model of household behavior, from retirement onwards, that is used
to evaluate the benefits and predict the demand for nominal and inflation-indexed
annuities. The model incorporates empirically parameterized mortality risk, both
inflation and real interest rate risk, a bequest motive, and diﬀerent annuity premia
for nominal and real annuities. The distribution of wealth held by households is also
empirically parameterized. The parameterization is done for two economies, namely
the U.S. and the U.K.
The model draws some interesting predictions. First, the welfare calculations on
the access to annuities markets show that nominal annuities are welfare improving
even when sold at the empirically parameterized cost, which is above the fair value.4
Real annuities are welfare improving over nominal annuities when sold at a fair price,
4A simillar result is found in Mitchell et al (1999).
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but when we incorporate the empirically parameterized annuity premium the gains
become negative at all wealth levels. This means that when given the choice con-
sumers would never choose to buy real instead of nominal annuities. This eﬀect is
stronger in the U.S. than in the U.K., mainly because the cost of inflation protection
is higher in U.S.. When a scenario of lower state pension is considered welfare gains
from both nominal and real annuities are increased.
The policy functions show that the demand for annuities is increasing in wealth,
and how it varies across diﬀerent parameterizations. Demand for annuities is higher
when state pensions are lower and when current inflation is higher. On the other hand,
a higher bequest motive decreases demand for annuities. The level of wealth above
which individuals start buying annuities is also aﬀected by diﬀerent parameterizations.
This has an important eﬀect on simulated participating rates.
The simulation of the model for the British population wealth distribution shows
that an important explanation for the little interest in annuities comes from the fact
that annuities are extremely expensive, compared with the total accumulated assets
hold by families. In other words many families can not aﬀord even to enter the annuity
market. These simulated demands are compared to the actual demands reported in
the Family Resources Survey. For those individuals who buy annuities, the simulated
demands are similar to those observed in the survey.
This paper also makes an important contribution for the literature debate on the
presence of adverse selection in annuities markets. The evidence on the presence of
adverse selection in annuities markets is usually based on the fact that the mortal-
ity rate of the annuitant population is lower than the mortality rate of the general
population. However, mortality rate is also negatively correlated with wealth accu-
mulation (see Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000). Therefore it becomes unclear whether
the fact that annuitants are longer lived results from active selection or passive selec-
tion, as described in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and Murthi, Orzag and Orzag
(1999). Distinguishing between the two types of selection is important because they
have diﬀerent policy implications. The present model provides a powerful example of
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passive selection. Only wealthier individuals participate in the annuity market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, model, solution
technique and parameterization are presented. In Section 3, welfare gains and the
policy functions for the demand for annuities are presented and discussed. Section 4
reports the simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model specification
Time parameters and preferences
I model consumption and asset choices of an household from retirement onwards.5
The household may either be an individual or a couple in which case the household
only dies when both individuals die. The household lives for a maximum of T periods.
I let each period in the model correspond to one year, and I allow for uncertainty in
the age of death in the manner of Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995). Let pt denote
the probability that the household is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at
date t − 1. Of course, p1 ≡ 1. Then, household i’s preferences are described by the
time-separable power utility function:
E1
TX
t=1
βt−1
³Yt−1
j=1
pj
´"
pt
C1−γit
1− γ + (1− pt)Bi
W 1−γi,t
1− γ
#
, (1)
where β is the time discount factor and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
With probability (1− pt) the household dies and leaves his wealth Wt as a bequest.
5The dynamic model is in the line of the precautionary savings literature models proposed by
Carroll (1997) and Deaton (1991).
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The parameter B measures the intensity of the bequest motive. In each period t,
t = 1, ..., T , the household chooses consumption Ct.
The term structure of nominal and real interest rates
Nominal and inflation-indexed annuities diﬀer because nominal interest rates are
variable over time. This variability comes from movements in both the expected
inflation rate and the ex ante real interest rate. Following Campbell and Cocco (2002)
I use a model that captures variability in both these components of the short-term
nominal interest rate, and allows for some predictability of interest rate movements.
Thus in the model there will be periods when households can rationally anticipate
declining or increasing short-term nominal interest rates.
I assume that expected inflation follows a first-order autoregressive process. That
is, log one-period expected inflation, π1t = log(1+Π1t), follows the process:
π1t = µ(1− φ) + φπ1,t−1 + ²t, (2)
where ²t is a normally distributed white noise shock with mean zero and variance σ
2
² .
The expected log real return on a one-period bond, r1t = log(1+R1t), is given by:
r1t = r + ψt, (3)
where r is the mean log real interest rate and ψt is a normally distributed white noise
shock with mean zero and variance σ2ψ.
The log yield on a one-period nominal bond, y1t = log(1+Y1t), is equal to the log
real return on a one-period bond plus expected inflation:
y1t = r1t + π1t. (4)
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To model long-term nominal interest rates, I assume that the log pure expectations
hypothesis holds for both nominal and real interest rates.6 That is, we assume that
the log yield on a long-term n-period nominal bond is equal to the expected sum of
successive log yields on one-period nominal bonds which are rolled over for n periods:
ynt = (1/n)
n−1X
i=0
Et[y1,t+i]. (5)
This model implies that excess returns on long-term bonds over short-term bonds are
unpredictable, even though changes in nominal short rates are partially predictable.
Available nominal and inflation-indexed annuity contracts
I study both nominal and inflation-indexed annuity contracts. If at retirement age
the interest rate on a nominal bond with maturity t is Yt,1, and the household pur-
chases a nominal annuity that makes an annual nominal payment of AN,N (where the
double superscript refers to the nominal payout of a nominal annuity), the expected
present discounted value (EPDV) of the annuity payouts is given by:
EPDV N1 =
TX
j=1
AN,N
Qj
k=1pk
(1+ Yj,1)j
. (6)
This EPDV can be compared with the premium cost of the annuity to obtain a
measure of the “money’s worth” of the annuity. The diﬀerence between EPDV N1
and the premium cost of the annuity covers expenses and other administrative costs
associated with the sales of annuities and normal profits of insurance companies. The
annuity premium (P ) and the money’s worth are therefore defined as:
AnnuityCost = (1+ P )× EPDV
6For a textbook exposition and summary of the empirical evidence on this model, see Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), Chapter 10.
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Money0sWorth = EPDV/AnnuityCost
In a nominal annuity payments are fixed at contract initiation, so that real annuity
payments AR,Nt are inversely proportional to the price level Pt:
AR,Nt =
AN,N
Pt
(7)
This implies that a nominal annuity contract is a risky contract because its real
capital value is highly sensitive to inflation.
Similarly, if at retirement age the interest rate on a inflation-indexed bond with
maturity t is Rt,1, and the household purchases an inflation-indexed annuity that
makes an annual real payment of AR,R (where the double superscript refers to the
real payout of a real annuity), the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the
annuity payouts is given by:
EPDV R1 =
TX
j=1
AR,R
Qj
k=1pk
(1+Rj,1)j
. (8)
Real annuity payments are fixed at contract initiation, and nominal payments
increase in proportion to the price level Pt. Thus, unlike a nominal annuity, the real
capital value of an inflation-indexed annuity is not sensitive to inflation.
Retirement Wealth and Pension Income
At retirement age the household has financial wealth W1, which he can use to
purchase an annuity. In addition, the household is endowed with gross real pension
income in each period, Lt. As usual I use a lower case letter to denote the natural log
of the variable, i.e., lt ≡ log(Lt). Household j’s age t real pension income is exogenous
and is given by:
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ljt = f(t, Zjt), (9)
where f(t, Zjt) is a deterministic function of age t and other individual characteristics
Zjt. Retirement or pension income is in most countries linked to lifetime earnings
which are known as of retirement. In addition, the assumption that real pension
income during retirement is deterministic implies that nominal pensions are inflation-
indexed. This assumption may be relaxed. It is important because a nominal pension
that increases at the rate of inflation is similar to an inflation-indexed annuity and
therefore may decrease the benefits of inflation-indexed annuities.
Summary of the household’s optimization problem
In summary, the household’s control variables are {Ct}Tt=1 and at the initial date
whether to convert initial wealth into an annuity. The vector of state variables can
be written as Xt =
n
t, y1t,Wt, Pt, π1t, A
R,i
t
oT
t=1
where Wt is real liquid wealth or cash-
on-hand, Pt is the date t price level and A
R,i
t , i = N,R is the date t real annuity on
the nominal/real annuity purchased at retirement.
The equation describing the evolution of real cash-on-hand can be written as:
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)(1+R1,t+1) + Lt+1 +AR,it+1, (10)
where i = N,R. This equation assumes that savings are invested in one-period
inflation-indexed bonds.
Solution technique
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the finite nature of the problem
a solution exists and can be obtained by backward induction. I discretize the state
space and the choice variables using equally spaced grids in the log scale. The density
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functions for the random variables will be approximated using Gaussian quadrature
methods to perform numerical integration (Tauchen and Hussey 1991).
2.2 Parameterization
An important component of any quantitatively focused study is the parameterization
of the model. With this respect, there are several issues that the reader should keep
in mind. First, I take one period in the model to represent one year and use annual
data throughout. Second, to the extent that inflation and interest rate processes or
longevity risk diﬀer across countries, the benefits of annuities will also diﬀer. In order
to explore these diﬀerences I calibrate the model for two countries, namely the US
and the UK.
Inflation and Interest Rate Processes
In order to estimate the inflation rate process I have used data for the US Con-
sumer Price Index from 1962 to 1999. The estimated parameters are shown in Table
1. The mean log inflation over this period was 4.6%, with a standard deviation of
3.9%, and a first-order autoregression coeﬃcient equal to 0.754. For the inflation rate
process for the UK I have used data from the Retail Price Index between 1985 and
2002. The mean and variances are considerably lower, this being partly due to the
diﬀerence in the sample period.7
In order to estimate the parameters for the real interest rate process I constructed
a measure of real interest rate by subtracting the logarithm of inflation to the log yield
on one-year US Treasury bonds. The mean annual log real yield is equal to 2%, and
it is fairly stable. For the UK I used the yield on Index-Linked British Government
7Inflation indexed bonds where only available in the UK after 1985. In order to be consistent
with the real interest rate estimation, the sample period for the inflation process also starts after
1985.
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Securities from 1985 to 2002. Mean log yield was 4.6% and also fairly stable. Results
are reported in Table 1.
Baseline Parameters
I study the problem of retirees, therefore, period one in my model is taken to
be age 65, the most common retirement age. Conditional survival probabilities for
male population is taken from the US census and the UK Government Actuary’s
Department, from ages 65 to 99. To simplify, I assume that the individual dies at age
100 with certainty, if he is still alive then. Several studies find supporting evidence
for the fact that survival probabilities for the population that buys annuities is larger
than for the population as a whole. However, it is not clear whether this is due to
active selection, in the sense that annuitants have more information of their survival
probabilities than insurance companies, or it results from passive selection, i.e., it
results from the fact that wealth and survival probabilities are correlated.
In the baseline case I use a coeﬃcient or relative risk aversion equal to 3 and a
discount factor equal to 0.98. The bequest parameter is set to zero. I have estimated
retirement income for the US by first calculating average income for the working
population, at age 65, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.8 Assuming a re-
placement ratio of 60% I obtain an estimate for the annual real pension at retirement
L equal to ten thousand US dollars. I assume that it is constant throughout retire-
ment. For the UK I have used the same methodology, but based on data from the
2002 Family Resources Survey.9 This resulted in an estimate of 6.24 thousand British
pounds. Table 2 summarizes these results.
8The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S.
individuals and the family units in which they reside. the sample size has grown from 4,800 families
in 1968 to more than 7,000 families in 2001. The study is conducted at the Survey Research Center,
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
9The Family Resources Survey collects information on the incomes and circumstances of approx-
imately 25,000 private households in Great Britain. It is sponsored by the Department for Work
and Pensions.
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Annuity Premium
Diﬀerent annuity markets show substantial pricing diﬀerences. In fact, as reported
in Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (2001) there can be a diﬀerence as a high as 10 percent
between the highest and the lowest industry payout, for a given annuity contract.
Given this, I rely on previous studies of the U.S. and the U.K. annuity industries
to calibrated the annuity premium parameter. More precisely, I obtain the value for
the annuity premium P using reported Money0sWorth. These Money0sWorth are
calculated using average annuity payouts available to a 65 year old male, discounted
using risk free interest rates and the population mortality tables described above.
For the U.S. market, and for nominal annuities, I set Money0sWorth equal to
0.85, as reported by Poterba & Warshawsky (2000). The corresponding value for real
annuities is 0.749 (Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (2000)).
The U.K. annuity market is divided in two segments: -compulsory annuity market,
where tax-qualified retirement funds are annuitized; - and a voluntary market, for all
other annuitizations. Although some studies find that Money0sWorth do not diﬀer
between the compulsory and the voluntary market (Murthy, Orzag and Orzag (1999)),
others do find that prices diﬀer in the two markets. For nominal annuities I have used
the estimates of Finkelstein and Poterba (2002), who report values of 0.87 and 0.9
for the voluntary and compulsory markets, respectively. For real annuities, and for
the compulsory market, I have set Money0sWorth equal to 0.85, following Brown,
Mitchell and Poterba (2001). Money0sWorth for real annuities in the voluntary
market is set equal to 0.8, following James and Vittas (1999). According to these
parameters, inflation protection seems to be less expensive in the U.K. than in the
U.S. This could be due to the fact that in the U.K. there is a developed inflation
index bond market which can be used by insurance companies to hedge inflation risk.
Wealth Distribution
In my model the household takes the level of wealth, at age 65, as given. Therefore,
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and in order to simulate the demand for annuities for the population as whole, we need
to parameterize the wealth distribution. I have used the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances, which oﬀers a detailed description of U.S. families financial condition, to
do so. In order to match the definition of wealth in my model to the one in the data
I add two variables, namely: income (which represents households’ gross income of
the previous year) and financial wealth (which represents households’ accumulated
wealth in financial assets).
To parameterize the U.K. wealth distribution I have used data from the 2002
Family Resources Survey. Here again I have added total derived capital and labor
income to obtain a measure of cash-in-hand. In both samples I have considered
individuals aged between 55 and 65, and made the necessary adjustments to have
the data for individual wealth instead of household wealth. Table 4 displays the
distribution percentiles for the two countries.
2.3 Welfare Metric
In order to assess the benefits of purchasing annuities I perform welfare calculations.
These calculations are done in the form of standard consumption-equivalent varia-
tions: for each annuity contract I compute the constant consumption stream that
makes the household as well-oﬀ in expected utility terms as the consumption stream
that can be financed by not acquiring an annuity. Relative utility losses are then
obtained by measuring the change in this equivalent consumption stream.
3 Welfare Gains and Policy Functions
In this section I study the welfare gains resulting from having access to the annuity
market and the optimal demand for annuities. At this stage I use the parameters
calibrated for the U.S. economy. As mentioned in the previous section, estimated
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inflation is higher for the U.S. than for the U.K. Therefore with the model calibrated
to the American economy we are likely to gain better insights as to the eﬀects of the
inflation process on the demand for nominal and real annuities. In order to compute
the welfare gains I consider diﬀerent scenarios. First, I compute the gains associated
from moving from a scenario with no access to annuities to one with access to nominal
annuities. After this, gains are computed from moving from nominal annuities to real
annuities. I will also consider diﬀerent paprameterizations.
Currently, governments are planning to decrease the benefits that they pay re-
tirees, so that households will have to rely more on accumulated financial wealth and
less on state pensions to finance consumption when old. To assess the implications of
such a scenario I consider a parameterization in which the annual real pension that
the household is endowed with decreases by a half, to five thousand dollars.
Figure 1 shows the average welfare gains of nominal annuities relative to the
scenario where households do not have access to annuity markets and do not purchase
annuities. Welfare gains are increasing in financial wealth and vary according to
diﬀerent parameterizations. Obviously welfare gains are higher when annuities are
available at a fair value, which means that their cost is equal to their EPDV, as
compared to annuities that have a premium cost, i.e. are cost adjusted. However,
when we consider the case where existing state pension in reduced to five thousand
dollars instead of ten, the welfare gains are the highest. In order to obtain some
insights on the magnitude of these welfare gains, let us consider the example of an
individual with median financial wealth, namely thirty seven thousand dollars. He
would have to be given an additional 3% increase in annual lifetime consumption in
order to be as well oﬀ as in a scenario with access to nominal annuities at a fair value.
However, if the individual only has access to nominal annuities subject to a premium
cost, the welfare gain drops to 1%. On the other hand, if the individual only obtains
five thousand dollars of state pension and has access to fair value nominal annuities
the welfare gain is as high as 7%.
I now compare welfare gains from real annuities relative to nominal annuities
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(Figure 2). Welfare gains are now much smaller. With nominal annuities the agent
already obtains longevity insurance, so that the added value of real annuities comes
from inflation risk protection. Inflation protection gains are positive and fairly rel-
evant specially for wealthier households when annuities are sold at their fair value.
Inflation protection becomes even more valuable when the state pension is decreased;
this results from the fact that the state pension is in eﬀect a real annuity. This is so
in our model as it is in most of the economies, because retirement state pensions are
indexed to the price level. However, if real annuities are sold at the price estimated
for the American annuity market, i.e. 42% above the EPDV, welfare gains become
negative. This means that consumers would never choose to buy these annuities if
they have the choice to buy nominal annuities, even when these are also cost adjusted.
This result explains why the market for real annuities almost does not exist in the
U.S.
Figure 3 compares the welfare gains (in this case losses) in the real annuity markets
in the U.S. and in the U.K.. Welfare losses are considerably smaller in the U.K.,
although still negative for higher wealth levels. According to this figure consumers
with lower wealth are indiﬀerent between real and nominal annuities, at the cost
which they are sold in the marketplace.
In the cases considered so far, I have assumed away the bequest motive. However
previous studies have shown that a bequest motive can be an important factor in
households’ consumption and saving decisions. I have solved the model with the
bequest parameter equal to 7. Figure 4 compares the welfare gains from access to
nominal annuities with and without a bequest motive. The presence of a strong desire
to leave bequest significantly reduces the utility gains from annuitizing households’
wealth. The bequest motive can significantly reduce the demand for annuities, and
can be viewed as a possible explanation for the little demand observed in the U.S.
annuity market.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the policy function for annuity demand as a function of
financial wealth. Annuity demand is defined in terms of the annual payout oﬀered
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by each contract. In order to obtain some guidance for the correspondence between
annual payouts and annuity cost, Table 5 shows the fair value cost for diﬀerent annuity
payouts. The demand function does not cross at the intercept for two reasons: (i)
the consumer has to finance current consumption, out of his current financial wealth;
(ii) there is a minimum amount of annuity the consumer has to buy, which I have
set equal to 0.5 thousand dollars.10 The wealth level above which individuals start
buying annuities will determine the participation rate in annuity markets. As one
would expect from the welfare analysis, annuity demand is an increasing function
of financial wealth. The demand for nominal annuities is higher, for each level of
financial wealth, than for real annuities. This is due to the higher cost of real annuities.
Although not shown, the demand for nominal annuities is also higher the higher is
inflation at the retirment age. This is due to the fact that this makes the cost of the
annuity lower. In case the state pension is lower, i.e. five thousand dollars, annuity
demand increases. The individual with median wealth would buy a nominal annuity
contract that gave him a payout of 3.22 thousand dollars, in case the price was fair. If
the annuity is sold with a cost premium, he would only buy 2.47. In case his pension
income is reduced his demand for a nominal annuity at a fair value would increase
to 3.78, which represents a 20% increase. This is a considerable value if we take into
account that his lifetime resources are now lower. The demand for real annuity is the
lowest, at 2.01, at a fair value price.
Figure 6 compares demand for nominal and real annuities in the U.S and the U.K..
The diﬀerences noticed are mainly due to diﬀerences in the inflation rate process and
in the level of pension income. Higher current inflation makes nominal annuities
cheaper in present value and therefore their demand is higher.
10In the U.K. most of the insurance companies do not provide annuity contracts for values under
10,000 pounds. However, there are a few which would consider selling an annuity worth 5,000
pounds.
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4 Simulation Results
Using the policy functions that resulted from the U.K. parameterized model I have
simulated annuity demand over a sample of 1000 individuals. Individuals diﬀer from
each other in their accumulated wealth at age 65. I have used the wealth distribution
estimated from the Family Resources Survey, which is representative of the British
population. The average demands for nominal and real annuities are shown in Table
6.
The diﬀerent scenarios considered are mutually exclusive in the sense that con-
sumers only choose how much to buy of a particular annuity. They do not have the
option to choose between diﬀerent annuity contracts. As we have seen before, this
would imply zero demand on some types of annuity contracts.
The first line of Table 6 shows average nominal annuity demand for the lower
and the upper half of the wealth distribution, when annuities are sold at a fair price.
Demand for nominal annuities is extremely low for the poorer half of the population,
with an average value of 150 pounds payout a year. When there is a positive annuity
premium cost, average demand is even lower. Given the higher cost of real annuities,
their demand is lower than that of nominal annuities. Moreover, the simulation results
show that only 65% of the population could aﬀord to enter the annuity market. When
we adjust the price of the annuity contract to that observed in reality, participation
rates become even lower, reaching a value as low as 56% for the real annuity contract
sold in the voluntary market.
The valuable lesson we learn from these simulations is that, even without consid-
ering extreme deviations from the standard consumption model, such as a positive
bequest motive, extreme risk aversion or even myopic consumers, the model predicts
surprisingly low demand for annuities. This suggests that one important explanation
for the fact that one observes little interest in annuities in the real world is that many
individuals can not aﬀord to buy them.
One of the components of income reported in the Family Resources Survey is an-
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nuity income. Table 7 compares the summary statistics for the survey data and for
the simulated data. The survey definition of annuity income excludes defined con-
tribution occupational pension schemes. Therefore, and in order to be consistent, I
compare it to the simulated demand for nominal annuities in the voluntary market.
The average demands shown are calculated for individuals with positive annuity in-
come. Simulated and survey average demands, for those participating in the annuity
market, are reasonably close. The main diﬀerence being the fact that simulated de-
mand is much more sensitive to wealth than survey demand.11 However, the model
over predicts participation rates. There are two possible ways of generating a smaller
gap between the two rates. On one hand, by increasing the bequest parameter or
reducing the discount factor one obtains lower predicted participation. On the other
hand, there is strong evidence of underreporting in the survey annuity income data
when compared with aggregate data (Banks and Emmerson (1999)).
5 Conclusion
This paper solves a dynamic model of households’ demand for nominal and inflation-
indexed annuities, in the context of uncertainty. Uncertainty comes from diﬀerent
sources: inflation, real interest rate and time of death. In order to draw realistic
predictions the parameters of the model are empirically calibrated for two economies,
namely U.S. and U.K.
Welfare calculations over the access of annuities markets show that nominal an-
nuities are welfare improving even when sold at the empirically parameterized cost.12
Real annuities are welfare improving over nominal annuities when sold at a fair price.
But when we incorporate the empirically parameterized annuity premium the gains
become negative at all wealth levels. This means that when given the choice con-
11In fact the regression slope of annuity income on wealth is 7 times higher in the simulated than
the survey data.
12A simillar result is found in Mitchell et al (1999).
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sumers would never choose to buy real instead of nominal annuities. This eﬀect is
stronger in the U.S. than in the U.K., mainly because the cost of inflation protection
is higher in U.S.. When a scenario of lower state pension is considered welfare gains
from both nominal and real annuities are higher.
The policy functions show that the demand for annuities is increasing in wealth,
and how it varies across diﬀerent parameterizations. Demand for annuities is higher
when state pensions are lower and when current inflation is higher. On the other hand,
a higher bequest motive decreases demand for annuities. The level of wealth above
which individuals start buying annuities is also aﬀected by diﬀerent parameterizations.
This has an important eﬀect on simulated participation rates.
The simulation of the model for the British population wealth distribution shows
that an important explanation for the little interest in annuities comes from the fact
that annuities are extremely expensive, compared with the total accumulated assets
held by families. In other words many families can not aﬀord even to enter the annuity
market.
Finally, the paper compares simulated demands to the actual demands reported in
the Family Resources Survey. For those individuals who buy annuities, the simulated
demands are not very diﬀerent from those observed in the survey.
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Table 1: Estimated parameters for Inflation and Interest Rate Processes
Description Parameter Value Value
US UK
Mean log inflation µ 0.046 0.016
S.d. of log inflation σ(π1t) 0.039 0.010
Autoregression parameter φ 0.754 0.690
Mean log real yield r 0.020 0.046
S.d. of real log yield σ(r1t) 0.022 0.016
Note: Data Series used for estimating the US processes were the Consumer Price Index
and Yield on one-year Treasury Bonds, from 1962 to 1999. Data Series used for estimating
the UK processes were the Retail Price Index and annual Yield on Index-Linked British
Government Securities, from 1985 to 2002.
Table 2: Baseline parameters
Description Parameter Value
Risk aversion γ 3
Discount factor β 0.98
Bequest motive B 0
US Real Pension L $ 10,000
UK Real Pension L $ 6,250
Note: US and UK real pensions are in thousand US Dollars and thousand Pounds
respectively. US Real Pension was estimated fromthe Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
1962-99. UK Real Pension was estimated using the Family Resources Survey year 2002.
Table 3: Annuity Premium above the Fair Value
Compulsory Voluntary
Nominal Real Nominal Real
US 17.64 (0.85) 42.85 (0.75)
UK 11.11 (0.90) 18.0 (0.85) 15.60 (0.86) 23.45 (0.81)
Note: Annuity premium above the fair price are in percentage points. Money’s Worth
of the annuity contract are in parenteses.
Table 4: Financial Wealth Distributions for the US and the UK
Financial Wealth
Percentile US (Thousand US Dollars) UK (Thousand Pounds)
10 3.81 3.53
20 8.29 6.29
30 16.60 8.64
40 25.78 11.50
50 36.75 15.08
60 54.97 19.25
70 82.45 25.51
80 129.95 36.58
90 246.18 61.63
Note: Financial Wealth is defined as liquid assets plus labor income held by individuals
aged between 55-65. The US wealth distribution was estimated using the 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances, and the UK wealth distribution was estimated using the 2002 Family
Resources Survey.
Table 5: Fair Value Annuity Cost, U.S. Parameterization.
Annual Payout Nominal Real
0.5 3.86 6.24
1.0 7.73 12.48
10.0 77.34 124.89
Note: Values in thousand U.S. Dollars.
Table 6: Demand for nominal and inflation-indexed annuities - U.K. calibration
Avg Demand Avg Demand Percentage with
Low 50th pct High 50th pct zero demand
Fair Price 0.15 5.39 35
Nominal Compulsory 0.11 4.96 39
Voluntary 0.10 4.86 40
Fair Price 0.12 4.87 37
Real Compulsory 0.08 4.27 42
Voluntary 0.06 4.11 44
Note: This table shows the average demand for nominal and real annuities, in thousand
British Pounds, for the lower and the upper half of the wealth distribution. Diﬀerent annuity
premia are considered.
Table 7: Summary statistics for simulated and survey data
Avg Demand Avg Demand Whole Participation
Low 50th pct High 50th pct Sample Rate
Simulated Data 0.52 4.86 4.13 60
Survey Data 1.57 3.18 2.71 3
Note: Average values are calculated only for individuals with positive annuity demand.
Simulated data is for nominal annuity in the voluntary market. Values in thousand British
Pounds
Figure 1: Welfare Gains from access to Nominal Annuities. 
Figure 2 : Welfare Gains from access to Real Annuities (Compared to Nominal Annuities).
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Figure 3 : Welfare Gains from cost adjusted Real Annuities in U.S. and U.K (Compared to Nominal Annuities).
Figure 4 : Welfare Gains from access to Nominal Annuities with Bequest Motive
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Figure 5 : Annuity Demand
Figure 6 : Annuity Demand in U.S. vs U.K. (Fair Value)
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